With Israel heading toward the 27 October election, former prime minister Naftali Bennett is presenting voters with a sharply different approach to the country’s wars and diplomatic challenges.
Bennett’s central criticism of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is that military operations may have delivered tactical successes, but Israel has failed to convert those gains into lasting diplomatic advantages.
In his assessment, the country has suffered a significant loss of international legitimacy since 7 October while allowing other regional and global powers to shape the diplomatic agenda.
Bennett argues that Israel needs to be both militarily strong and diplomatically proactive.
He has compared the country to a “gorilla” that must not only possess strength but also help shape the environment in which it operates.
Gaza Becomes the Main Test of Bennett’s Alternative
On Gaza, Bennett broadly agrees with Netanyahu that Israel needs to maintain a significant security presence while working to prevent Hamas from rebuilding its military capabilities.
Where the two approaches differ is in how Bennett believes that objective should be achieved.
Bennett argues that Netanyahu has effectively relied on military force without developing a credible diplomatic strategy for Gaza.
He believes Hamas can only be weakened through a combination of military pressure, regional cooperation and sustained diplomacy.
The former prime minister has also questioned the practicality of relying exclusively on the Gaza vision promoted by US President Donald Trump.
In his view, Israel’s failure to develop a sufficiently detailed alternative has left Washington’s proposal with greater influence over the future of the territory.
Bennett Puts Egypt at the Centre of His Gaza Strategy
For Bennett, Egypt would be the key regional player in any long-term plan for Gaza.
He argues that Cairo has been pushed away from Israel’s strategic calculations and that relations with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi should instead be restored and strengthened.
Bennett believes an Israeli prime minister should meet Sisi regularly and maintain close communication with him.
His argument is that rebuilding trust with Egypt could encourage Cairo to play a much larger role in efforts to contain Hamas and establish greater stability in Gaza.
He has suggested that Egyptian forces could potentially contribute to security arrangements because Egypt has regional influence and a greater understanding of the local environment.
However, there is a major unanswered question surrounding that proposal.
There is little public evidence that Egypt is currently prepared to deploy its own troops into Gaza to confront Hamas directly.
That means Bennett’s strategy depends heavily on the assumption that relationships between Jerusalem and Cairo could be transformed into a much deeper operational partnership.
Bennett Blames Coalition Hardliners for Damaging Regional Ties
Bennett has also criticised the influence of far-right ministers Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, arguing that their policies have damaged Israel’s relationships with Egypt, Jordan and other regional partners.
He has similarly pointed to violence by Jewish extremists in the West Bank as another factor undermining Israel’s international standing.
In Bennett’s assessment, Israel should be concentrating its military and diplomatic credibility on genuine security priorities rather than suffering additional diplomatic damage from actions that he considers avoidable.
He believes stronger cooperation with Egypt, Jordan, the Abraham Accords states, potential new partners, the US and European countries could create greater pressure on Hamas and ultimately contribute to its disarmament.
Bennett Rejects a Full Palestinian Authority Return to Gaza
Despite his criticism of Netanyahu, Bennett is not proposing a full embrace of the Trump administration’s vision for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza.
He has maintained his long-standing opposition to Palestinian statehood but appears willing to give the Palestinian Authority a limited role in Gaza while supporting efforts to strengthen it in the West Bank.
For Bennett, such an approach could help rebuild relationships with Washington, Cairo and other international partners without requiring Israel to abandon its position on Palestinian statehood.
His strategy instead rests on the belief that Egypt, alongside Israel, is uniquely positioned to exert meaningful pressure on Hamas.
Iran Could See a Bigger Role for Mossad
Iran represents another major area where Bennett believes his previous experience could prove valuable.
One scenario facing a future Bennett government would be Iran rapidly expanding its ballistic missile capabilities while Trump prevents Israel from openly conducting another major air campaign against the Iranian regime.
In such circumstances, Bennett could reportedly look toward Mossad to play a greater operational role in countering Iran’s missile programme.
That would represent a partial shift from placing the Israel Defense Forces at the centre of the campaign to relying more heavily on intelligence and covert capabilities.
The IDF would nevertheless remain central to any response to an Iranian nuclear breakthrough, particularly if Washington authorised direct military action.
Bennett Points to His Previous Record on Iran
Bennett’s confidence on Iran is partly based on his experience as prime minister between 2021 and 2022.
During that period, Israel was increasingly concerned about Iran’s progress in uranium enrichment and its wider nuclear capabilities.
Bennett argued at the time that Israel had failed to adapt quickly enough to changes in Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes.
His government subsequently pushed the defence establishment to improve Israel’s ability to strike Iranian targets.
That effort reportedly involved the IDF, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael and Mossad, with officials working to accelerate weapons and operational plans designed for long-range operations against Iran.
The development process was complicated, with some defence officials initially estimating that the necessary capabilities could take years to prepare.
Mossad director David Barnea was reportedly prepared to redirect resources in an attempt to accelerate the process.
Bennett’s supporters can therefore point to his previous government as evidence that he is prepared to pressure Israel’s security establishment to respond quickly when strategic threats change.
Lebanon Offers Fewer Differences Between the Rivals
Bennett’s disagreements with Netanyahu are less pronounced when it comes to Lebanon.
He does not believe Hezbollah can necessarily be dismantled or disarmed using the same approach he advocates for Hamas.
Like Netanyahu, he supports maintaining a security zone for the foreseeable future while the Hezbollah threat remains unresolved.
Nevertheless, Bennett believes diplomatic opportunities could still exist in Lebanon.
His broader argument is that an Israel with stronger international relationships would have greater room to exploit such openings when they appear.
Syria Remains a Strategic Question Mark
Syria presents a more complicated challenge for Bennett.
He has questioned the intentions of Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and remains uncertain whether the Syrian leader has genuinely abandoned his previous jihadist outlook.
Until Israel has greater clarity, Bennett’s preferred approach would be to maintain the existing buffer zone and avoid making premature concessions.
He would also need to balance Israel’s security concerns against Trump’s reported interest in helping Syria normalise relations with its neighbours and potentially encouraging Israeli withdrawals.
For Bennett, the immediate priority would therefore be gathering more intelligence and determining whether al-Sharaa represents a genuine change or merely a different version of an old threat.
Election Will Put Two Very Different Strategies to the Test
Bennett’s overall message is that Israel cannot win its post-7 October battles through military power alone.
He argues that Israel needs a combination of deterrence, intelligence, military strength and aggressive diplomacy, particularly with countries such as Egypt and Jordan and with the United States.
His supporters believe his previous record demonstrates that he can challenge the defence establishment and accelerate preparations against emerging threats.
Critics, however, could question whether his diplomatic proposals—particularly the expectation that Egypt would take a much more direct role in Gaza—are realistic.
What’s Next for Israel’s War and Peace Policy?
The October election will give Israeli voters a choice between competing approaches to national security.
Bennett is promising to retain tough military policies in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria while placing far greater emphasis on diplomacy and regional alliances.
His strategy would also seek to maintain pressure on Iran through intelligence and military preparations while avoiding unnecessary confrontations with Washington.
Whether those ideas can deliver better results than Netanyahu’s approach will ultimately depend on factors beyond any Israeli prime minister’s control, including the positions of Trump, Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf states and Iran.
Summary
Bennett’s challenge to Netanyahu centres on one fundamental argument: Israel has relied too heavily on military power while failing to use diplomacy as effectively as it could.
He supports continued security measures against Hamas and Hezbollah and remains cautious about Syria and Iran.
But he believes stronger relationships with Egypt, Jordan, the US and other international partners could give Israel greater leverage.
The most controversial part of his programme is his belief that Egypt could become a central security partner in Gaza.
Whether Cairo would accept such a role remains uncertain.
For now, Bennett is asking Israeli voters to take a different view of the country’s post-7 October strategy—one in which military strength remains essential, but diplomacy becomes a weapon in its own right.
