Boris Johnson Rejects Government ID Card Proposal and Warns British Citizens of Privacy Risks Across the United Kingdom

Boris Johnson Rejects Government ID Card Proposal and Warns British Citizens of Privacy Risks Across the United Kingdom

If you handed me an ID card tomorrow I’d treat it like a bad joke — bin it, delete the email, block the sender.

That’s not hyperbole; it’s a matter of principle.

I simply refuse to sign up for any government scheme that turns our phones into surveillance devices and piles another layer of bureaucracy on ordinary people.

Twenty years ago we fought this one off — and I’m arguing we should do the same again.

Phones Aren’t Just Phones — They Would Become State Trackers

The latest idea — a state-backed ID stored on your smartphone — sounds neat until you think about what that actually means.

Who gets to live in the database? How do you protect it? The plan, as sketched, would collect and store vast amounts of personal data: name, address, DOB, National Insurance, job, height, eye and hair colour, and sex.

That’s a lot of sensitive stuff to put in one place, and our track record on big IT projects is not encouraging.

We still can’t deliver a consistently digitised NHS record, and getting a passport or driving licence often feels like wading through Soviet-style delays.

The Costs Would Be Staggering — And Who Pays?

This is not a tiny program you can roll out quietly.

By the time every edge case is dealt with — non-British workers, children, overseas residents — the bill will be enormous.

We’re talking billions upon billions, far beyond what was imagined, at a time when taxes are already high and public services are under pressure. It will make projects like HS2 look cheap by comparison.

And for what problem? Employers already have legal duties to check right-to-work documents; firms can ask for passports and visas and face stiff fines if they don’t. So the cost-benefit case for this is weak.

Privacy and Security Risks Would Hit Ordinary People Hardest

This scheme won’t stop criminals. It will inconvenience everyone else. Government databases are attractive targets — look at recent breaches at big British companies and the supply chain headaches in industry.

Every time we centralise personal data we create a risk that will extend to millions of blameless citizens.

And once the state starts collecting more and more data, it’s very hard to put the genie back in the bottle.

Britain’s History Shows Why We’re Wary of ID Cards

We have a historical instinct against these sorts of identity schemes.

The wartime identity cards were tolerated then because of the national emergency — but even so, people grew to resent them.

The real turning point came after the war, when Clarence Willcock refused to produce his card after a traffic stop and the courts sided with him; that rejection of compulsory ID is part of why Britain has historically resisted an identity-card culture. It’s a cautionary tale we should remember.

This Won’t Help the Immigration Problem — It Will Pile Paperwork on the Innocent

If the goal is to deter dangerous Channel crossings and stop criminal smuggling, an enormous, intrusive ID database is a blunt and expensive instrument.

There are simpler, more direct levers: firm asylum and repatriation policies that make it clear reckless journeys are pointless.

Tougher returns policies — the kind of hard-line approach some other countries use — would do more to deter crossings than slapping a national ID onto everyone’s phone.

Politics Explains Why This Idea Has Reappeared

Why has the ID-card idea resurfaced now? It looks very much like political manoeuvring — a shiny, headline-grabbing policy pulled off the shelf while other, more serious problems pile up.

When a party faces internal and economic pressures, tempting old ideas get dusted down.

And the timing seems aimed at looking like action while avoiding the politically difficult but effective moves that would actually change outcomes on immigration.

Practical Questions That Go Unanswered

Who is required to apply? What about children or temporary workers? How will the system be audited and secured? These practicalities matter — and they’re the places where cost and complexity explode.

Any attempt to make this universal will be bogged down for years and will probably still deliver a flawed system that’s expensive and vulnerable.

My Bottom Line

I won’t carry a government ID card. I won’t put my family through the hassle, and I won’t accept the risks to our privacy and civil liberties.

There are legitimate debates to be had about immigration and security, but turning everyone’s phone into a government ID is not the answer.

Let’s fix the problems that matter with practical, focused policies — and leave the papers-please mentality in the past.